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Table of Contents

Introduction

Wrongful Discharge

Emotional distress; Extreme and Outrageous Conduct

Contract Claims

Claims under CT's Retaliation Statutes

Early Retirement and Older Workers

Discrimination Claims under CT's Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA)

Filing Requirements for Federal Claims

Title VII

Sexual Harassment

ADEA - Age Discrimination

ADA - Disability Discrimination

Desk Graphic by Inki

, Atty.
152 Simsbury Road
Avon, CT  06001
(860) 678-7711

Page revised 12/01/03

An Employment Law
Primer for Connecticut Employees

, Attorney
152 Simsbury Road
Avon, CT  06001
(860) 678-7711

Preface

This article is focused on remedies for Connecticut employees. It does, however, have information about remedies in general that may be helpful to employees living in other states. For instance, information about federal statutory claims and common law claims may be of some help to non-Connecticut employees. Information about Connecticut's Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), however, probably would not be of use to persons living in other states.

This is an evolutionary work: new sections are added periodically and existing ones are updated to reflect important developments in the area of labor and employment law. A companion page, Labor and Employment Resources for Connecticut Employees contains links to all the statutes referenced in this article as well as other useful links and references.

Caution

This article is not legal advice about anyone's particular situation. It provides information about the law, which the author hopes may assist readers in understanding their rights and obligations. If you believe your rights have been violated, you should discuss the matter with an attorney or with someone at one of the government agencies mentioned in this article.

Introduction

In Connecticut, employees fall into two major categories: "at will" or those with contracts for continued employment. At will employees are so called because they can be terminated at the will of the employer, for any reason or for no reason at all, or can leave their jobs at any time at their own free will. Contractual employees have the protection (and, perhaps, obligations) of their employment contracts. Contracts typically contain a provision that an employee can be terminated only "for cause," or they may specify a particular number of months or years of employment. Contracts may also contain provisions for severance packages if an employee is terminated for business reasons. A contract need not be written, but can also be oral, so long as the agree-upon terms are clear.

At will employees are not without their remedies for discharge, however. No employee can be discharged, either directly or "constructively" /1/ in violation of state law, federal law or public policy. There are specific state and federal laws prohibiting discrimination based on race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, age, and other factors. In addition, Connecticut's public policy exception to the at-will employee doctrine prohibits discharge when the termination violates a public policy that can be found in state or federal law. There are also specific state anti-retaliation statutes that prohibit discharge for specific reasons, i.e. for "whistle-blowing," or exercising rights under the workers' compensation statutes. An employer may not take an action against an employee because he or she has reported harassment, or testified about discrimination.

This article will provide a brief overview of the remedies available to employees who are discharged or subjected to discrimination in Connecticut. Again, it is not legal advice about any particular person's legal rights.

Legal remedies contain very strict filing requirements and deadlines for filing at the agency level or in court. If you think you might have a claim, you should consult with an attorney as soon as possible to determine what remedies may be available and the applicable filing deadlines.

Wrongful Discharge

Wrongful discharge is a civil claim against an employer who discharges an employee in violation of a "public policy" of the State of Connecticut or the United States. Public policy can be found in case law, statutes, or agency regulations. Wrongful discharge is a remedy available to all employees, whether contractual or at will.

An example is provided by a recent important case, Parsons v. United Technologies Corp. /2/ In Parsons, an employee protested his transfer to the Persian Gulf during the Gulf War and was immediately fired. The court reasoned that the employer had a duty under state law to provide a safe work environment. The Court concluded that employees have a legal claim against an employer if the employee is discharged for refusing to work under conditions that pose a substantial risk of death, disease or serious physical harm not contemplated within the scope of the employee's duties. Other examples would be firing an employee who refused to falsify records or to commit an illegal act.

Emotional Distress; Extreme and Outrageous Conduct

Employers can be liable for subjecting their employees to emotional distress if the employer's conduct is intentional, the conduct is "extreme and outrageous," and the conduct causes emotional distress which is severe. /3/. This is commonly referred to as intentional infliction of emotional distress.

As an example, in Nwachukwu v. State of Connecticut Dept. of Labor /4/, the employee was allowed to pursue an emotional distress claim to remedy continual racial harassment by a supervisor (continually subjecting her to a raised voice and hostile attitude, imposing arbitrary requirements on her work, and criticizing her intelligence and her "afro" hair style). In Mellaly v. Eastman Kodak /5/, an employee was constantly derided by his supervisor because he was a recovering alcoholic. Employees who bring successful emotional distress claims can recover tort-like damages and punitive damages. In Connecticut, unlike some other states, punitive damages are limited to the amount of the attorneys' fees unless specially provided by a statute.

Employers have also been held legally responsible for negligent infliction of emotional distress caused by unreasonable conduct. In order to be actionable, the employer's conduct must have been unreasonable and the plaintiff must show the employer knew, or should have known, that its conduct was likely to cause significant emotional distress. In Parsons v. United Technologies, the Supreme Court stated that it was not unreasonable for the employer to give the employee a security escort from the building immediately after the discharge. The employee was fired two hours after he protested his transfer to the Persian Gulf. The usual emotional distress that arises out of the termination itself cannot support a claim for negligent infliction. But if the employer makes false accusations of impropriety or cruel comments about the employee's work, it may suffice.

The general rule had been, until recently, that employers are not liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress except in the context of termination of employment. The reason was that any injury during the course of the employment was covered under the Workers' Compensation Act. But that is an area of the law which is changing: recently, the Connecticut legislature decided that emotional distress claims would not be covered under the Workers' Compensation Act any more. So the limitation on bringing lawsuits against employers for negligent infliction of emotional distress was recently challenged in a trial court decision in Karanda v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 1999 WL 329703 (Conn. Super., May 10, 1999) (NO. CV-98-582025S). In Karanda, Judge Hale ruled that because the remedy of workers' compensation for workplace emotional distress has been taken away from employees, they are no longer barred from bringing those claims in the Superior Court.

Claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress must be filed within two (2) years.

In any claim that contains allegations of emotional distress damages, plaintiffs are required to undergo the rigors of "discovery" on those claims. Employers may be entitled to obtain copies of the employee's medical and psychiatric records, employment records and delve into private problems that may be other sources of emotional distress. See, "Emotional Distress Discovery in Employment Discrimination Cases," New York Law Journal (Aug. 24, 1998).

Contract Claims

A contract is simply an agreement, such as, if you do this work we will give you this amount of pay and these benefits. A contract may be either written or oral. It may be express, if the terms have been stated fully and explicitly, or it may be implied from the conduct or statements which have been made by the employer.

Employees can sue for breach of the terms of a traditional written employment contract or an express oral contract. Courts may also find "implied contracts" from express oral promises or assurances made by employers, or from promises found in policy and procedure manuals issued by the employer.

For example, in Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., /6/ the Supreme Court held that an employee had an implied contract with his employer that he could be terminated only "for cause," because a representative told him during the job interview that the employer would "take care of him" if he did a good job and they hoped he would stay forever. In addition, the procedure manual provided that employment could be terminated only for cause. An employee must be able to show definite statements made by the employer, however; an employee's beliefs and feelings are inadequate to establish an implied contract. /7/

Retaliation Statutes

Employees who are disciplined or discharged in retaliation for exercising rights guaranteed to them by state statutes or the state and federal constitutions can bring claims under specific retaliation statutes. For example, it is against state law for employers to discipline or discharge employees for:

• Whistleblowing - reporting to a public official, a violation or suspected violation by their employer of state or federal law. Claims must be filed within 90 days of the employee's exhaustion of any administrative remedies (grievance proceedings, for example) or 90 days from the reporting of the violation, whichever is later. Damages available: reinstatement, back pay, benefits, costs and attorneys' fees. C.G.S. § 31-51m. Legal article: Whistle blower protection laws in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut.

• Fundamental Rights - retaliation for the exercise of important fundamental rights (speech, religion, assembly) guaranteed under the state and federal constitutions. Damages available: reinstatement, consequential damages including lost wages and benefits, punitive damages, costs and attorneys' fees. C.G.S. § 31-51q.

• Family and Medical Leave Act - retaliation for taking or requesting a protected leave. C.G.S. § 31-51pp.

• Workers Compensation Claims - retaliation for filing a Workers' Compensation claim. C.G.S. § 31-290a.

• Examples of other protected rights or issues giving rise to wrongful termination claims - to join or form unions, serve on jury duty, to file a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO), to file a complaint with the Labor Commission, to have wages garnished in accordance with a child support order, to file an OSHA complaint, to exercise the right to obtain information concerning toxic substances in the workplace, use of surveillance in certain areas of the workplace, blacklisting, polygraphs, privacy of certain records, military duty, drug testing, appearing in court as a witness.

Early Retirement and Protections for Older Workers

Early retirement or exit incentive plans are governed by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA). Under the Act, employees cannot waive their rights to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), unless they do so in a written document which is carefully designed to assure that they understand their rights. The written waiver must specifically state that ADEA rights are waived, must advise the employee to consult an attorney before signing, and must allow the employee at least 45 days to consider the waiver before signing (21 days in some circumstances). The waiver must also describe the criteria under which eligibility for early retirement is afforded (i.e. job title, age, time limits). In addition, the early retirement or incentive plan must provide benefits beyond that which the employee would normally be entitled, in order for the employee to bargain away ADEA rights.

The OWBPA also mandates that older workers receive the same benefits as younger workers, unless the employer can prove that the cost of the benefits to older works is significantly greater.

Discrimination Claims

State discrimination statutes. Connecticut's Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA) prohibits discrimination based upon "race, color, religious creed, age, sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental disorder, mental retardation, learning disability or physical disability ..." C.G.S. § 46a-60. The Act also prohibits discrimination based upon pregnancy, and another statute prohibits discrimination based upon sexual orientation. In a number of instances, Connecticut's protection is broader than that provided under federal law. For example, it provides a relatively strict right to reinstatement to the same job or an equivalent job with equal pay, after a pregnancy/maternity leave. Read the full text of the statutory sections describing the discriminatory practices prohibited under Connecticut's fair employment act. Link to the full text of the complete Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stats. 46a-51, et seq. at the Connecticut State Library Site.

Filing deadlines are short and strictly enforced. A complainant must file a complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. C.G.S. § 46a-82. (There are some complaints which must be filed in 30 days. For example, complaints based upon discrimination due to conviction of a crime must be filed within 30 days.) Once a complaint is served upon the employer, it must file answers and provide its justification for the employment action at issue. The complainant can rebut the statements made by the employer. The CHRO has 90 days after the employer files its answers, to determine whether it will dismiss the complaint or proceed to investigate it. C.G.S. § 46a-83. If the CHRO decides to act on the claim, it will conduct a fact finding conference to determine whether there is good cause to believe an act of discrimination took place. If it finds good cause for such a belief, it will hold a public hearing and issue a decision within time guidelines governed by the statutes. The CHRO will also make efforts to get the parties to come to an agreement resolving the complaint. The damages available to complainants in the CHRO are usually more limited than those available to a complainant in court proceedings. For example, the CHRO does not have the jurisdiction to award damages for emotional distress or attorneys fees. /8/ Typical damages awarded are reinstatement and back pay within the discretion of the hearing officer. C.G.S. § 46a-86(b). The CHRO may take additional actions to eliminate or prevent discrimination, such as filing an action in court against the employer or issuing a cease and desist order.

After the claim has been pending for 210 days, the complainant may request a "right to sue" release from the CHRO which allows suit to be filed in the Superior Court. Suit must be filed within 90 days of the right to sue (RTS) release. C.G.S. § 46a-101. Suits must be filed within 2 years of the original date of filing in the CHRO. C.G.S. § 46a-102.

Filing Requirements for Federal Claims

There are also agency filing requirements for persons raising federal discrimination claims (i.e. a Title VII claim for sex or race discrimination). Complaints must be filed in the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the action constituting discrimination. The CHRO is a "deferral agency" for EEOC and claims are typically "cross-filed" by checking the cross-filing box on the CHRO complaint form.

Because the EEOC does not have a local office, the CHRO will automatically file the complaint with the regional EEOC office and investigate for the EEOC. The EEOC will usually adopt the findings of the CHRO. However, a complainant has the right to request the EEOC to review the file and the findings of the CHRO after its investigation and to come up with its own conclusions. After a matter has been filed with the EEOC for 180 days, a complainant may request a Right to Sue Letter and withdraw the action from the jurisdiction of the EEOC and sue in federal court. Suits must be brought within 90 days of the issuance of the right to sue (RTS) notice issued by the EEOC.

If the complainant does not cross-file when filing the original CHRO complaint, complainants who file in the CHRO first have an extended EEOC filing period of 300 days from the date of the discriminatory action. In some circumstances, an employee missing the 180-day limitation period can take advantage of the extended 300 day filing period by filing an untimely complaint in the CHRO first and requesting that the complaint be cross-filed with the EEOC, thus preserving federal claims.

Federal Remedies

Congress has enacted several statutes that deal with the problem of discrimination in the workplace. These laws include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Equal Pay Act of 1963.

Title VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991), 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., provides that it is unlawful for an employer

• to fail or refuse to hire an individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin; or

• to limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Note that the discriminatory conduct prohibited under the federal statute are not as broad as those provided under Connecticut's Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA). However, the money damages that can be recovered under the federal statutes is greater than that recoverable under FEPA.

Claims made under the federal discrimination statutes are administered by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Anyone filing a claim of discrimination has 180 days from the alleged discriminatory act to file with the EEOC by filing with the CHRO in Connecticut, as discussed above in "Filing Requirements for Federal Claims." Both compensatory and punitive damages are available under Title VII, but there are limits imposed by the statute. Compensatory damages (including emotional distress damages) are capped at $300,000 per charge depending upon the size of the company. Punitive damages are available in limited situations. Under Title VII, attorney’s fees are also available to the plaintiff.

Sexual Harassment

There are two types of sexual harassment claims available under state and federal law: "quid pro quo" harassment and "hostile environment" harassment. Quid pro quo means, basically, that someone sought to get something and promised to give something in return. To establish a case of quid pro quo sexual harassment, "a plaintiff must present evidence that she was subject to unwelcome sexual conduct and that her reaction to that conduct was then used as the basis for decisions affecting the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment." Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1994). To be actionable, the conduct directed to the employee does not need to be direct or sexually explicit. Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 1998 WL 119614, 76 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 700 (2nd Cir. Mar 19, 1998). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth , --- U.S. ---, 118 S .Ct. 2257 (No. 97-569, June 26, 1998) that an employee who suffered no adverse job consequences - such as being fired or losing a promotion - after refusing to submit to a supervisor's sexual advances may still be entitled to pursue a sexual harassment claim. The Plaintiff in Ellerth suffered continual harassment by her supervisor, including threats to deny her job benefits. See also Karibian, 14 F.3d at 779 (employer can be liable for quid pro quo harassment by a supervisor if the employee (1) rejects the advances and suffers the consequences, or (1) submits to the advances in order to avoid the consequences). Under the Karibian analysis, the employee need not demonstrate actual negative consequences. It is the linking of the threat of job conditions to sexual favors that makes the conduct unlawful.

To succeed in a hostile environment claim, the Plaintiff must be able to show that "the conduct must have been sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). To determine whether a case meets this standard, courts must take into consideration the "constellation of surrounding circumstances" and the social context in which the particular behavior occurred. Common sense and an appropriate sensitivity to social context are required. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 118 Sup. Ct. 998, 140 L.E.2d 998, 76 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 221, 1998 WL 88039, at *4 (March 4 1998). In addition, a reasonable person would have to find the environment hostile or abusive (an "objective" test), and the victim's perception of the conduct must have been that it was abusive or hostile (a "subjective" test). Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. at 21. In order to constitute legally recognizable harassment, the acts constituting harassment must be "pervasive," meaning continuous and concerted or, if infrequent, very severe. Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989). The employee does not need to prove that engaging in sexual activity was the goal of the harassment as long as the comments or conduct is gender-based. In a recent landmark ruling, the Supreme Court held in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, supra, that sexual harassment that occurs between employees of the same sex is actionable under Title VII.

An employer will not be liable for a hostile environment created by co-workers, if the employer acts promptly and adequately in response to the employee's complaint and effectively remedies the situation. If the harasser is a supervisor who abuses the power of his position to further the harassment, however, an employer may be liable even in the absence of knowledge of the unlawful conduct. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, --- U.S. ---, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (No. 97-282, June 26, 1998). See also Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780-81. The Supreme Court in Faragher provided for an affirmative defense to liability or damages if no tangible employment action is taken. In order to afford itself of the affirmative defense, an employer must show by a preponderance of the evidence (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. No affirmative defense is available when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action.

For a more detailed summary of the historic 1997-98 term of the United States Supreme Court, read LABOR LAW: Review of Supreme Court's 1997-98 Term.

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 - 634 prohibits discrimination by employers because of age in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment. This law only applies to workers over the age of forty (40) and does not provide any protection to individuals under the age of forty (40).

The ADEA's initial filing requirements are similar to the process described in "Filing Requirements for Federal Claims." After a charge has been filed with the EEOC and has been pending for 60 days a lawsuit may be filed in the United States District Court up to two years from the date of original filing with the EEOC. However, if a right to sue is requested from the EEOC, one has ninety (90) days to file a lawsuit in U.S. District Court from the date of receipt of the right to sue notification.

It is not necessary to prove that the older worker was replaced by a younger person, although such evidence is admissible when available. Once an employee establishes the basics of an age discrimination case, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate an age-neutral and legitimate business reason for its actions. Once the employer demonstrates the age-neutral reason, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the real reason for the adverse action was age. Common discrimination claims advanced are a) allegations of discriminatory discharge of older workers in order to save the costs associated with older employees or employees with a longer tenure; b) discrimination against older workers when the workforce is reduced by discriminatory selection for layoffs; c) forced early retirement or d) discrimination in promotion or training opportunities.

Damages available under the ADEA include back pay, front pay, other out of pocket losses, interest, costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. If the discrimination is found to be intentional, the backpay can be doubled as "liquidated damages." The ADEA also provides for various types of equitable relief including hiring, transfer, reinstatement, promotion and injunctive relief.

The Americans with Disabilities Act

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., applies to employers and other groups with fifteen or more employees. (The similar Rehabilitation Act applies to government employers and federal contractors.) The ADA protects individuals who have a "disability," as it is defined in the ADA, but are qualified to perform the essential functions of a job, with or without reasonable accommodations. The definition of an individual with a disability under this Act is different from the definition of "disability" under certain other laws, such as the Social Security statutes. A disability is defined by the ADA as a

• a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;

• a record of such impairment; or

• being regarded as having such impairment.

In 1999, the Supreme Court decided a trio of cases that defined what it means to be impaired under the ADA. Link to article: "Limiting ADA to the Disabled."

One must be able to show that with a "reasonable accommodation" for a mental or physical impairment one can perform the essential functions of a job. The burden of demonstrating the reasonable accommodation is on the employee. The ADA's paradox is that an employee must prove a "substantially limiting" disability, while at the same time proving that they are fully able to work if accommodated. In addition, if a disabled employee applies for and receives state or federal disability benefits, that evidence may be used as evidence that the employee has admitted s/he is unable to work. In May 1999, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Cleveland v. Policy Mgt. Systems Corp (No. 97-1008) (decision below 120 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1997)), holding that the application for, or receipt of, disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act does not create a legal presumption that the employee is not a 'qualified individual with a disability' under the ADA. The plaintiff must, however, deal with the apparent contradiction that arises out of an SSDI total disability claim and provide a convincing explanation of why the plaintiff could nonetheless perform the essential functions of his/her job, with our without "reasonable accommodations."

The nature and extent of "reasonable accommodation" was addressed by the EEOC in an Enforcement Guideline issued on March 3, 1999. Link to an article discussing the Guideline. Link to the text of the EEOC Guideline.

Statistics show that due to the difficulties of proof under the ADA, most cases are won by employers. These statistics do not paint the whole picture, however, because many meritorious suits are settled and their numbers were not included in the statistical analysis.

The initial filing requirements for the ADA are essentially the same as for Title VII, described above in "Filing Requirements for Federal Claims." A claim must be made with the investigative agency, the CHRO, within one hundred and eighty (180) days of the discriminatory act. After the claim has been pending in the EEOC for 180 days, a right to sue letter may be requested from the EEOC and a suit filed in United States District Court within ninety (90) days of receipt of the right to sue letter.

Remedies that are available under the ADA are essentially the same remedies available under Title VII.

Retaliation. If an employee is retaliated against because a complaint was made to the employer, an action was filed, or because the employee opposed an unlawful practice, that retaliation is also actionable. The employee must prove that the adverse action of the employer was retaliatory, that is, that the action was taken because of the protected activity. See EEOC Compliance Manual on Retaliation (providing guidance and instructions for investigating and analyzing claims of retaliation under the statutes enforced by the EEOC)(Directives Transmittal No. 915.003, May 20, 1998).

Endnotes

/1/ A constructive discharge is one that is implied from the circumstances. For instance, a constructive discharge may occur when conditions are made so intolerable for an employee that they have no choice but to leave the employment. Larkin v. Town of West Hartford, 891 F. Supp. 719 (D. Conn. 1995) affirmed 101 F.3d 109. In order to prevail on a constructive discharge theory, the employee must have acted reasonably.

/2/ Parsons v. United Technology, 243 Conn. 66, 700 A.2d 655 (1997); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980).

/3/ DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 225, 597 A.2d 807 (1991); Murray v. Bridgeport Hospital, 40 Conn. Supp. 56, 480 A.2d 610 (1984).

/4// Nwachukwu v. State of Connecticut Dept. of Labor, 1998 WL 123073 (Sup. Ct., Hennessey, J., Mar. 4, 1998). See also Lin v. Yale University, 1998 WL 573250 (Conn.Super., Aug 25, 1998) (NO. CV 960384551S).

/5/ Mellaly v. Eastman Kodak, 42 Conn. Supp. 17, 597 A.2d 846 (1991).

/6/ Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 662 A.2d 89 (1995); Barry v. Posi-Seal Intern., Inc., 36 Conn.App. 1, 647 A.2d 1031 certification denied 231 Conn. 942, on reconsideration 235 Conn. 901, on remand 40 Conn.App. 577, certification denied 237 Conn. 917, certification denied 231 Conn. 942, certification granted, cause remanded, 235 Conn. 901, on remand 40 Conn.App. 577, certification denied 237 Conn. 917.

/7/ Reynolds v. Chrysler First Commercial Corp., 40 Conn.App. 725, 673 A.2d 573 (Conn. App. 1996), cert. denied 237 Conn. 913, 675 A.2d 885.

/8/ Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities v. Truelove and Maclean, Inc., 238 Conn. 337, 680 A.2d 1261 (1996) (damages for emotional distress arising from discriminatory employment practice cannot be predicated on violation of the statute); Bridgeport Hosp. v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 232 Conn. 91, 653 A.2d 782 (1995) (emotional distress damages and attorneys fees not awardable by the Commission under the statute).