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A discussion of the problem of relocation of a child of divorced parents and Connecticut's Supreme Court decision in Ireland v. Ireland. Ireland v. Ireland. Rev. 02/08/08
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"Move Away" Cases. The question of whether the parent who has primary physical custody of a child can relocate after a divorce is a difficult one for courts and the parties. The Connecticut Supreme Court recently provided guidelines for parental relocation after divorce in Ireland v. Ireland, 256 Conn. 413 (Aug. 18, 1998). Commentators agree that the Ireland decision will make it easier for custodial parents to relocate for legitimate purposes if the purpose of the move is not vindictive or to undermine the other parent's relationship with the child. A subsequent decision has limited the Ireland analysis to relocation cases that arise "post-judgment," or after the parties are divorced. (See discussion of Ford v. Ford, below). At the time the initial decision is made, the court will focus on the "best interests of the child standard". In Ireland, the parties had been awarded joint custody of the child with primary physical custody awarded to the mother. The child's mother sought to move to California in order to allow her new husband to take a computer consulting job after his previous consulting contract expired. The trial court (Stanley, J.) denied the motion on the grounds that the child's father enjoyed a close relationship with the child, the move to California would substantially interfere with that relationship and would not be in the best interests of the child. Writing for a majority of the en-banc (fully-assembled) Supreme Court, Associate Justice Katz reversed the trial court and returned the case for further proceedings. Justice Katz reasoned that the realities of divorce result in an alteration of the relationship between both parents and the child and it is not realistic to attempt to preserve completely the quality and nature of the relationship that the non-custodial parent enjoyed, especially if such preservation is at the cost of the custodial parent's ability to start a new life and financially support herself. Justice Katz also found it important to balance the interests of the old family unit against the interests of the new blended family unit which resulted from the custodial parent's second marriage. Justice Katz drew on the thinking of family psychologists that the interests of the child are intertwined with the interests of the custodial parent--limiting a parent's choices as to life's opportunities may result in a diminished quality of life, diminished economic resources and lower personal satisfaction which would impact on both the parent and the child. 246 Conn. at 422-24 (citing J. Wallerstein & T. Tanke, "To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce," 30 Fam. L. Q. 305, 315 (1996)). The Court emphasized, however, that its analysis was predicated upon legitimate and proper motives for the move. If the purpose of the move was vindictive or to thwart or interfere with the relationship between the non-custodial parent and child, the court would consider such motives improper and would not sanction the move. 246 Conn. at 424. The court held that the custodial parent who wishes to relocate the child bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that (1) the relocation is for a legitimate purpose and (2) that the proposed location is reasonable. Once the custodial parent establishes those elements, the burden shifts to the non-custodial parent to prove to the court that the relocation would not be in the best interests of the child. 246 Conn. at 428. The non-custodial parent bears the latter burden because he or she will have access to the information concerning distance, difficulty in maintaining visitation, etc., that would be relevant to the court's determination of the issue. In order to determine the "best interests of the child," the Ireland court incorporated the multi-factored approach adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in Tropea v. Tropea, 87 N.Y.2d 727, 665 N.E.2d 145, 642 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1996). The court will consider:
246 Conn. at 433-34. The Court emphasized that no one factor is so important as to determine the outcome of the case. As an example, the Court stated that in a given case the loss of midweek or every weekend visits necessitated by a move might be "devastating" to the relationship between the non-custodial parent and the child. However, the Court reasoned that less frequent but more extended visits over summers and school vacations would be equally effective in maintaining a close parent/child relationship. 246 Conn. at 434. The Court also also warned that the list of factors was not exclusive and that trial judges can consider other circumstances that have a bearing on the child's best interests. In Ireland, the parent seeking to relocate had been awarded primary physical custody of the child. The Court did not address the issue of whether it would approach the relocation question differently if the parents had been awarded shared physical custody of the child. Relocation decisions as part of the initial divorce judgment. In Ford v. Ford [PDF], 68 Conn. App. 173, 789 A.2d 1104 (Feb. 12. 2002) the Appellate Court ruled that the Ireland analysis applies only to cases in which the relocation issue arises after the divorce has gone to judgment. The opinion was authored by Judge Dranginis, the former statewide chief judge for family matters and therefore the opinion should carry great weight. Judge Dranginis ruled that (1) relocation issues that exist at the time the couple is initially divorce are governed the the "best interest of the child standard," which is the general standard governing custody decisions; and (2) the Ireland burden-shifting scheme that was developed in post-divorce relocation cases, does not apply to relocation issues that arise at the initial judgment for the dissolution of marriage. Judge Dranginis reasoned that at the time of the divorce, the post-divorce relationship between the child and the custodial parent has not yet been established. In addition, there is not a new family unit (such as existed in Ireland) to take into consideration. And because the parties are on a more equal footing at the time the original custody decision is made, it makes no sense to shift the burden to the party seeking to change the court's previous order, as Ireland requires. At the time the original custody decision is made, the focus is squarely on the best interest of the child. When one of the parents seeks to relocate, the focus is on the parent's interests and how those interests are intertwined with the best interest of the child. Finally, Judge Dranginis concluded that while the Ireland factors may be considered as "best interest factors" and give guidance to the trial court, they are not mandatory or exclusive.
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